Thank you, Dan, for your opening statement. Here is
my initial response.
Strong vs. weak atheism
I’ll
ask readers to note that in Dan’s first paragraph he chooses to defend weak
atheism, rather than assume any burden of proof for his answer to the question
“Does God exist?” This seems appropriate, given the rather weak responses in
his opening statement. He immediately lowered the bar for his side of the
debate, then failed to even meet that standard.
He
states, “I do not claim, nor is it necessary, to prove that the Christian God
does not exist… demonstrating that Ben’s arguments for the Christian God are
fatally flawed is sufficient to conclude that such beliefs are irrational.” Recall
that we are debating about the existence of God, not the mere rational status
of my beliefs. All of my beliefs in this regard could be “fatally flawed” and
that would not prove anything with respect to the subject of the debate. I am
arguing, “God exists,” while Dan is merely arguing, “Some of Ben’s beliefs are
irrational.” Let’s investigate now whether or not he has satisfied the
significantly reduced burden of proof which he has placed upon himself.
Defining the term “God”
Dan
alleges that there are many contradictions in the definition of God which I
referenced in my opening statement. He doesn’t show that there are any
contradictions, he merely alleges as much. He chooses divine incomprehensibility
as noteworthy, then demonstrates that he hasn’t been taking good notes.
Equivocation
is the misleading use of terms which have multiple definitions. When Dan says
of divine incomprehensibility, “It would be a simple matter for me to agree
with this part of the definition and claim victory,” he equivocates (an
informal fallacy). “Incomprehensible” is synonymous with “non-intelligibility”
in most contexts; however, divine
incomprehensibility refers to the doctrine that God cannot be fully
comprehended and is unknowable apart from self-revelation. This standard
definition is referred to as a “common retort” by Dan, which makes him seem
less credible. It’s not a retort; it’s a standard definition in Christian
theology which has been maintained across many cultures and centuries.
If
he can demonstrate a contradiction in the doctrine of divine
incomprehensibility (or the definition of God), then he should simply do
so—rather than equivocating and obfuscating. When one desires to refute another’s
position, it would behoove him to be familiar with the standard definitions
associated with that position before attempting refutation. A bare familiarity
with some standard work in systematic theology would prevent these sorts of unfortunate errors. Before one can
effectively “undermine Christianity” one must correctly understand
Christianity.
Actual vs. potential infinite
Dan
also seems to be unfamiliar with the common distinction (tracing its roots all
the way back to Aristotle)
between actual and potential infinity. This is evidenced by
the scare quotes around “actual” in statements such as, “We’ll see later how
Ben attempts to make the concept of infinite ‘actual’, and then tie ‘God’ to
the ‘actual’ infinite, and why this doesn’t work.” He also asserts twice that
“infinite means without limits,” which is simply a reference to potential
infinity (e.g. limits in calculus). Actual infinity is a set with infinite
members, such as the set of all positive integers {1, 2, 3, 4,…}. These are
non-controversial, introductory matters in set theory which are important to
even understanding, much less refuting, the Transcendental Argument for God
from Mathematics (TAG-M).
Axioms?
Dan
has also made a couple of unsubstantiated assertions about what he calls
“axioms,” e.g. Einstein’s work depends upon “deeper axioms” than a belief in
space-time, I’m relying upon certain axioms to conclude that God exists, etc. I’m
confused by Dan’s use of this term and I’d ask him to clarify what sense of “axiom”
he is using, please. If he’s referring to, say, axioms in geometry used to
derive theorems, then I fail to see the relevance of his statements. These
axioms are simply stipulations used for mathematical modeling (as in Einstein’s
physics). However, if he means the term in a more philosophical sense, as referring
to necessary or self-evident truths, then he has again equivocated in explicitly
referencing Einstein’s axioms in this other sense. Logic and math share many
similarities but they are not mutually reducible to each other.
Using
the term “axiom” to refer to a necessary truth is just a wishful assertion—“wishful”
in the sense that most often when one refers to a philosophical principle as an
“axiom” he is just attempting to convince an audience, without argument, that the principle is indeed a self-evident and
necessary truth. This was a common conflation among the ancient Greeks,
however, most today would grant that our math and philosophy have advanced some
since then (terminologically, at the very least!). Unfortunately for Dan, in
both math and philosophy you sometimes need to substantiate your axioms with
proofs and arguments, respectively.
Ipse
dixitism
Dan
is quite fond of alleging his opponents have committed various logical
fallacies. However, the mere allegation of fallacious reasoning is insufficient
to establish that a fallacy has actually been committed. Ironically, merely
asserting something is the case without substantiation is an informal fallacy
known as ipse dixit or the “bare
assertion fallacy.” Dan will need to get his hands dirty demonstrating that
I’ve committed the various fallacies he’s alleged, rather than the mere
hand-waving and just-so assertions he’s given thus far. Dan tells us, on his
bare authority, that numbers, propositions, persons, etc. are all just what he
says they are. No need for argument, that’s just the way it is. God just
doesn’t exist. QED.
Calling
something a fallacy and demonstrating it is a fallacy are two very different
things; and bare assertions don’t rise to the level of reasoned argumentation,
no matter how often they are repeated or rephrased.
Reification
Everywhere
Dan looks he seems to see somebody fallaciously reifying something. He sees it
in the first three of my four arguments. I’m sure if he looks long enough, he
could find it in the fourth as well. He may need to check his sources on this
one, however. First, reification is not always fallacious; it is particularly common
in rhetoric and literature, through the use of metaphor. Second, and more
importantly, fallacious reification attributes concrete characteristics to abstractions.
Referring to numbers as mental objects simply does not attribute any concrete
characteristics to them at all. At the risk of stating the obvious, an
abstraction is a mental object—an
idea. If arguing that a number is an idea commits the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness, then anything goes. Up so floating many bells down. I argued that
numbers are mental objects; Dan says, no, they are metaphors. But what is a
metaphor, if not (at least) a mental object as well? I’d suggest Dan may want
to holster this fallacy until he figures out which end fires the bullets (*note
the non-fallacious reification*).
Numbers and Logic
Dan
says, “Numbers do not exist, as Ben asserts, independent of our brains that
conceive of them.” So, if everything with a brain woke up dead tomorrow, how
much would 2+2 equal? If you answered 4, according to Dan, you’d be wrong. All
the numbers would have died with our brains. If you were riding in a car with me
when all the brains in the world died, then there wouldn’t be two of us there
afterward. We can project right now that there would be two of us in the car
after the sudden global brain death (because we still have working brains), but
after it happens there will not be two dead bodies in the car anymore. The dead
bodies would be there and there would be two of them, but there couldn’t actually be two of them because there
aren’t any numbers anymore. The clocks will keep running, but there won’t be
any numbers to correspond with the passage of time. The billions of stars will
still be there, but there won’t be billions of them anymore. Dan’s view is an
absurd groupthink-meets-metaphysical-solipsism. Meanwhile, it remains painfully
obvious that numbers and mathematics transcend our brains as demonstrated by
the existence of actual infinite sets of mental objects, as I argued.
The
same problem exists for Dan’s response to Anderson/Welty’s argument from logic.
Does the principle of non-contradiction cease to apply the moment after global
brain death? Did it apply during the timeline of evolution, before brains
existed? Of course it did, but that means it transcends our brains. And if laws
of logic are absolute mental entities, they must inhere in an absolute mind,
i.e. the mind of God. Denying this principle produces the sorts of absurdities
already discussed. Further, to say that the laws of logic are merely
descriptive while repeatedly accusing me of committing logical fallacies is
problematic. This is just Hume’s classic “is-ought problem;” but you can’t
derive a prescription from a description without committing a category error.
Question-begging assertions
Many
of Dan’s criticisms are simply question-begging. He believes one thing, and I
believe something different. On the basis of the fact of this difference, Dan
declares me wrong. He assumes his own position to be correct, without argument,
then declares mine incorrect for not matching his. This is viciously circular.
An
example: “Ben’s minimalist definition of personal, ‘rational, self-conscious
entity’ is an equivocation. Ben wants the attribute of a person without the
physical baggage that comes with it.” To assert that a “person” can only be
physical begs the question against immaterialism. He’ll need to refute
immaterialism on its own terms, rather than by direct appeal to physicalism. More
examples could be adduced in this regard.
Dan
has asserted that “numbers are metaphors,” “propositions are symbolic
representations,” and “theories of truth… are simply our subjective
understanding of what the word truth means.”
He
has also stated that math “model[s] reality, but is not reality itself,”
numbers and propositions “are symbolic
representations of some aspect of reality,” that “we perceive some aspect of
reality,” etc.
On
the one hand, Dan wishes to say that all these things are subjective, reducible
to our perceptions—to the point that if our collective consciousness dies, math
and logic and truth die with it.
On
the other hand he wishes to say that there is an objective reality which
corresponds with those perceptions. (Unless he’s using the term “reality” as
synonymous with “our perceptions,” which would make his statements consistent
with subjectivism, but uselessly tautological.)
But
one can’t be a subjectivist-realist any more than he can be an atheist-polytheist.
So how does Dan propose to bridge the gap between subject and object? I’ll
predict that whatever answer he proposes will be self-refuting apart from
acknowledging the role of divine self-revelation in epistemology.
A Minor Point of Clarification
In
Dan’s closing statement he quotes Dr. James Anderson’s article “Calvinism and
the First Sin.” I think Dan has misunderstood James, for when he states “sin is
intrinsically irrational” James means that the act of disobeying God (i.e.
sinning) is irrational, not that the Christian doctrine of sin per se is irrational. I think if Dan re-reads
this section of the paper he’ll see his mistake.
…speaking of sin
Finally,
I’ll point out that these intellectual discussions connect directly with
flesh-and-bone in that, if my position is correct then Dan’s position is not
merely mistaken, it is sinful. One of the noetic effects of sin is turning
rational creatures made in God’s image into irrational God-haters. I ask Dan to
repent of using the intellect which God has given him in order to argue against
the truth, and I ask him to become a thinker free from sin, embracing reason in
Jesus Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.
(Colossians 2:3)
I
look forward to reading Dan’s next response, assuming no global brain death
occurs before then.
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