My name is Dan Courtney, and I’m the President of
the Freethinkers of Upstate New York. I live near Rochester, NY with my wife,
and I’ve been active in the atheist community for several years. I’ll be
defending the position that belief in the Christian conception of God is not
reasonable.
“I. There is but one
only, living, and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most
pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions; immutable, immense,
eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, most wise, most holy, most free, most
absolute; working all things according to the counsel of His own immutable and
most righteous will, for His own glory; most loving, gracious, merciful,
long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression,
and sin; the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him; and withal, most just,
and terrible in His judgments, hating all sin, and who will by no means clear
the guilty.
Of the many contradictions and equivocations
apparent in this definition, “incomprehensible” strikes me as noteworthy. It
would be a simple matter for me to agree with this part of the definition and
claim victory. The common retort, however, is that ‘incomprehensible’ means
that God is not understood exhaustively, because we are finite while God is
infinite. But the assertion that God is infinite, which means without limits,
is itself an unproven assertion. We’ll see later how Ben attempts to make the
concept of infinite “actual”, and then tie “God” to the “actual” infinite, and why
this doesn’t work.
Ben lays out four arguments, two positive arguments
for God, and two arguments against atheism. I’ll respond to each one in turn.
Ben’s
argument is that mathematics is, “a system of internal relationships…all the
relations must be consistent in order for any of them to be consistent.” He
then concludes that, “in a system of internal relations, the infinite must be
actual rather than potential.”
First
I should note that mathematics is a means for humans to model reality, but it
is not reality itself. Mathematics is a conceptual description of reality that
allows us to manipulate our model in an effort to make predictions about
reality. In that sense mathematics is a useful tool. We should also note that
infinite means without limits. The conclusion that, in mathematics, infinite
must be ‘actual’ simply means that we cannot place a limit on the
relationships. It does not mean, as Ben implies, that the concept of infinite
is a real, existent entity.
The
problem is compounded when numbers are referred to as “mental objects”, and he
concludes that “if numbers are mental objects which are members of an actual
infinite set, this requires the existence of an infinite mind where they inhere—the
mind of an eternal, omniscient God.”
Ben
is committing the reification fallacy by referring to numbers as objects.
Numbers are metaphors; symbolic representations of some aspect of reality.
Numbers are conceptual representations of relationships between aspects of
reality. Numbers do not exist, as Ben asserts, independent of our brains that
conceive of them.
Ben
quotes verbatim from The Lord of
Non-Contradiction by Dr. James Anderson and Greg Welty. This is interesting
because I recently turned down the option for “some kind of written exchange”
with Dr. Anderson, and instead I’m working on a video critiquing one of his
papers. Nonetheless, this argument appears to be a mix between St. Anselm’s
ontological argument, and the transcendental argument.
Again,
we start off with a reification fallacy when they write, “Propositions are real
entities.” Like numbers, propositions are symbolic representations of some
aspect of reality, and do not ‘exist’ independent of the brain that is
conceiving them. The error manifests itself when they state that the laws of
logic (as propositions/thoughts), “must exist in every possible world.” Again,
we perceive some aspect of reality, and then organize these perceptions in
order to form the thoughts, which are then expressed as propositions. The
propositions, collectively called the laws of logic, simply represent some
aspect of reality, and are not reality itself.
From
this flawed premise, Anderson/Welty go on to butcher the meaning of ‘person’ by
asserting that “there must be a necessarily existent person”, and that this
person must be, “spiritual in nature”.
I
can see three logical fallacies that are immediately apparent in this argument.
First, we’re told that, “Reality is ultimately personal or non-personal.” In
this sense, ‘personal’ means having the characteristics of a person. This is
the reification fallacy again, in which the conceptual notion of reality
(existence), is presented in terms of a physical object (a person). Second,
Ben’s minimalist definition of personal, “rational, self-conscious entity” is
an equivocation. Ben wants the attribute of a person without the physical
baggage that comes with it. But even the term ‘entity’ betrays the first
premise because an entity has distinct existence, while reality is existence in
its totality. So it would be a contradiction for something to be part of the whole,
and the whole, at the same time and in the same manner. The third fallacy is
one of composition. We’re told that, “problems arise in explaining how
personality emerges from non-personality”, and it is implied that personality
cannot emerge from non-personality. Since personality is simply the combination
of qualities that form an individual’s distinctive character, then it is simply
a label we apply to a combination of qualities. Rivers, for example, do not
need to emerge from other rivers, but they are simply a label we use to
describe water under specific circumstances.
To summarize this argument, a theory of
truth requires a mind, and atheists believe there was a time in the past when
there were no minds. Ben then asks, “would it be true to say of that time that
no minds existed then?” I accept Ben’s premise, so answering his question in
the affirmative is simply a tautology. But Ben concludes that “If the answer is
“yes,” then how can something that was not true at that time become true now
with reference to then?” Ben is simply confusing a “theory of truth” with truth
itself. Theories of truth, such as correspondence theory, are simply our
subjective understanding of what the word truth means and how it relates to
reality. In correspondence theory, truth relates to whether a proposition
corresponds with reality. Without a mind to form a proposition, the idea of
truth, in this context, is meaningless. And today, with minds available to form
propositions about the past, the truthfulness of the proposition (made in the
present) is independent of whether there was a mind (in the past) to assess its
correspondence to reality.